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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
though severance payments may be so construed if the employer
is legally obligated to make them. 12 However, in the latter case,
severance payments do not disqualify a claimant for benefits
unless they are paid "with respect to" a particular week, thus
meeting the dual test for unemployment.
The employer who believes that a labor contract which pro-
vides for a guaranteed annual wage, payable in spite of a lay-
off, will be his only "compensation" to employees will find that
he is mistaken. Unemployment compensation benefits may also
be payable, and these are debited to the employer's experience
rating and can increase his contribution rate or, at least inhibit
its reduction. Although this seems to be a double payment,
"'double payment could only exist where the payments are for
the same thing, same period of time, same consideration, same
scope and nature.' "13 The employer, along with the consumer
to whom these added costs are passed, subsidizes this protection
against one of the risks common to all workers.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
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ZONING
In Moncla v. City of Lafayette," a property owner success-
fully attacked the validity of a zoning ordinance. Although within
the appeal time the city might have adopted a regular ordinance
to replace the one invalidated, its response instead was to enact
a new temporary emergency ordinance and thereafter to adopt
a permanent one pursuant to regular delays provided in the city
charter. The property owner made an application for a building
permit varying from the emergency zoning ordinance and upon
denial, obtained a court order invalidating the ordinance on the
ground that no emergency existed; a court of appeal affirmed.
A dissenting judge urged the need to protect citizens against
zoning violations during the adoption of a permanent ordinance
allowances," in the latter; but both were a form of remuneration for services
rendered prior to separation from employment. The courts look at the na-
ture of the payment and when it is made.
12. Swift & Co. v. Brown, 132 So.2d 508 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). These
were dismissal payments which the employing unit was legally required to
make. See LA. R.S. 23:1472(20)(C)(III) (1970).
13. Swift & Co. v. Brown, 132 So.2d 508, 513 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 241 So.2d 307 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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as justifying emergency action, noting that without such an
emergency ordinance the property owner might now compel the
city to issue a building permit for his non-conforming project on
the theory that there was no valid zoning ordinance at the time
of his application. The validity of a regular ordinance made retro-
active as to applications pending at the time of its enactment
was not before the court and was not commented upon.
In Summerell v. Phillips,2 a property owner attacked success-
fully by way of mandamus a council resolution suspending issu-
ance of trailer park permits pending further study. After the
writ issued, the council adopted an ordinance restricting trailer
park permits to designated zoning districts. The mandamused
city official then moved for a new trial on the basis of the newly
enacted ordinance. Since the validity of the ordinance had
not been challenged, the district court dismissed plaintiff's suit
on this ground. On appeal, however, the ordinance was suc-
cessfully challenged3 and our supreme court granted certiorari.
That court held that it was error to entertain the constitutional
attack at the appellate level as an original matter and remanded
the case to the trial court for the property owner to plead the
new issue. Dissenters would have decided the issue of constitu-
tionality, since it had already been decided by a court of appeal.
They also protested that to allow a plea of unconstitutionality to
a statute enacted after a judgment was in effect to sanction an
improper replicatory plea.4 However, the court approved ency-
clopedic jurisprudence that plaintiff in a mandamus proceeding
may attack the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance excus-
ing the respondent from performance."" It found no statutory
impediment to the adoption of this "majority" rule in Louisiana.
A New Orleans zoning ordinance authorized a property
owner to request variance if zoning limitations imposed upon
him unusual and practical difficulties or particular hardship; it
required that such variances be in harmony with general zoning
purposes and serve not merely the convenience of the property
owner, but also alleviate a demonstrated and unusual hardship
or difficulty. In Garden District Association v. City of New Or-
leans,6 a court of appeal extended the procedure to a presently
2. 258 La. 587, 247 So.2d 542 (1971).
3. Summerell v. Phillips, 238 So.2d 786 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
4. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 852.
5. 258 La. 587, 595, 247 So.2d 542, 545 (1971), and authorities cited therein.
6. 238 So.2d 267 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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non-conforming but legal use where the variance would improve,
but not extend, present use.
A Jefferson Parish zoning ordinance vested authority to issue
building permits in a safety director; permits were revocable only
where work in violation of the code had been stopped, notice
posted, and the owner or agent notified in writing of violation
of the code. In Dunn v. Parish of Jefferson,7 a building permit
had been issued and installations made. Thereafter the safety
director revoked the permit without posting the property or
notifying the owner of the violation, and the latter attacked the
revocation's validity seeking a writ of prohibition. The parish
defended on the ground that the property owner had failed to
exhaust the administrative remedy of an appeal to a zoning ap-
peals board. A court of appeal, however, found no authority for
such appeal except where the director had acted within his au-
thority; exhaustion of the administrative remedy was deemed
unnecessary where the agency had committed clear error of law.
Where, as here, the property owner had changed his position on
the basis of agency action, principles of estoppel might have
seemed a preferable answer to the parish defense rather than
entirely outlawing administrative review of unauthorized action,
as the court seems to have done.
An interesting reversal of roles occurred in Chism v. City of
Baton Rouge;8 instead of the city seeking to impose regulation
upon a taxpayer in the interest of public health, the taxpayer
sought to enjoin the city, on the basis of health considerations,
-from reducing its garbage pickups. Since any hazard to health
could be remedied by taxpayer's providing appropriate contain-
ers, and the only injury taxpayer could show was the cost of
such additional containers or the expense of employing private
haulers, there was no irreparable injury and therefore no occa-
sion for the issuance of an injunction.
In a per curiam opinion in Plessala v. Landry,9 a court of
appeal refused to entertain an attack on the constitutionality of
the provision for trial of contested election cases. The legisla-
tion directs the Secretary of State to furnish absentee ballots
not less than twenty days before an election and provides that
in the event of an election contest, where a district court judg-
7. 242 So.2d 845 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
8. 244 So.2d 48 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
9. 244 So.2d 298 (La. App. 1st CIr. 1970).
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ment has been rendered and appeal taken, the Secretary is to
print the name of the successful district court litigant upon the
ballot, thus mooting the appeal, if no decision on appeal has been
had prior to the voting period. Noting that parties would be.
deprived of any legislatively authorized procedure to contest an
election if invalidated, and further noting that election matters
are beyond control of the judiciary in the absence of special au-!
thority, the court dismissed the appeal. It thus treated as a po-
litical question the legislative decision to make a district court
judgment final where necessary to provide absentee ballots an
appropriate period before an election.
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ASSESSMENTS
Municipalities are authorized by the legislature to "levy and..
collect local or special assessments on the real property abutting
the improvements . . . sufficient in amount to defray the total
cost of the works. . . ."' In Williams v. City of Shreveport,2 the
municipality had assessed the cost of improvements to a street
entirely upon the abutting privately owned property, although
city property as well as privately owned property abutted there-
on. This was deemed in accordance with its authority to levy an
assessment sufficient to cover the total cost of the improvement..
A court of appeal rejected the underlying argument that public.
property, because exempt from taxation, was also exempt from
assessment; as to abutting public property, the city must pay an
assessment thereon as an agent of the entire body of citizens,
who are assumed to that extent to benefit. The fact that the
public property consisted of esplanades along the middle of the
boulevard was not deemed to change the result, since they were
not part of the street and as such occupied the position of ordi-
nary abutting property.
In Bussie v. Long,8 our supreme court has now approved a
"public" action 4 for a writ of mandamus directing the tax com-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 33:3301 (1950).
2. 241 So.2d 598 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
3. 257 La. 623, 243 So.2d (1971).
4. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 483-86 (1965)
for analysis and defense of this development.
